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THE STATE JUDICIARY*
Jomq D. CARRoI.
Formerly Chief Justice of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
I esteem it an unusual honor and privilege to speak -to the
Circuit Judges and Commonwealth Attorneys of the state, meeting in
joint assembly,, together with this fine gathering of lawyers from
all parts of the state, and I have selected as the subject of my remarks the State Judiciary, believing that some observation concerning this branch of the government would be appropriate to the
occasion.
Although I am not unaware of the fact that in these days people are little concerned about old things, however important the
place they had in the early history of the state, I thought it might
not be without some interest to briefly trace the origin and development of our judiciary system, especially as it relates to the Court of
Appeals and courts that may be said to have preceded the present
circuit court system.
In the first Constitution of the state, adopted in 1792, provision
was made for a Supreme Court, without designating the number of
judges, to be styled the "Court of Appeals," and such inferior courts
as the legislature might establish, the judges of these courts to be appointed by the Governor, and hold office "during good behavior."
In this Constitution the Court of Appeals was given not only
appellate jurisdiction, but "original and final" jurisdiction in all
cases respecting the title to land, but this original jurisdiction had
become so burdensome to the court that it was taken away by the
legislature in 1875, pursuant to power to do this.
And as illustrating how profoundly the people at that time
were concerned about land titles it was declared in the Constitution that the opinions of the court in this class of cases should be in
writing, and delivered in open court, and if a judge dissented the
reasons for his dissent should be given in writing. The parties to
*Delivered at a meeting of the Circuit Judges and Commonwealth Attorneys
of Kentucky at Louisville, Dec., 1920.
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these cases also had the right to demand in the Court of Appeals a

jury trial.
In the second Constitution, promulgated in August, 1799, like
provision was made for the appointment by the Gavernor of all
appellate and inferior judges who should hold office "during good
behavior," but in this and subsequent Constitutions the Court of
Appeals was only given such appellate jurisdiction as might be provided by the legislature.
The third Constitution was adopted in June, 1850, and in this
Constitution the first change was made from an appointed to an
elective judiciary, and the terms of appellate judges, four in number,
fixed at eight years, and circ it judges at six years. The number
of circuit districts created was eleven; now we have thirty-six. How
many of these are unnecessary I shall not, on this occasion, undertake to say, but may be permitted to observe in passing that the
present districts are very unequal in population and business, and
there is urgent public need for the redistricting of the state and
the reduction of the numbdr of districts. In this Constitution there
is found the first constitutional mention of circuit judges, and they
were given then, as in the present Constitution, such jurisdiction
as the legislature might confer.
The present Constitution, adopted in 1891, continued the elective
system, and the terms of office and jurisdiction of appellate and
circuit courts as it was in the Cotastitution of 1850, except that the
Court of Appeals was given authority to issue such original writs
as would enable it to exercise a general control over inferior courts.
The first Court of Appeals, consisting of three judges, was established by an act of June, 1792, aAd held its first sessions at Lexington, but in 1796 provision was made for its location at Prankfort, where it has since remained. In this act it was given the original jurisdiction provided for in the first Constitution, and further
provided that all cases pending on appeal in the Supreme Court
for the District of Kentucky while the now state of Kentucky was
a part of Virginia, and all cases pending in the Virginia Court of Ap-
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peals, that had been appealed from the Supreme Court for the
District of Kentucky to that court should be removed to the Court
of Appeals. Provision was also made for appeal from the Court
of Quarter Sessions.
The first and second Constitutions did not prescribe the number of judges, but the legislature, in 1792, fixed the number at three
and court was so constituted until 1801, when the number of judges
was increased to four, but in 1813 the number was again reduced
to three, and so continued until the Constitution of 1850, in which
the number was fixed at four, and the court continued to consist of
four judges from 1850 until the present Constitution, in which the
number was fixed at not less than five nor more than seven, and
pursuant to this authority, the legislature, in 1893, fixed the number at seven.
In this connection it may be noticed that the Court of Appeals
had no jurisdiction of appeals in criminal or penl cases until
after the Constitution of 1850. In this Constitution the nature of
its jurisdiction was left to the legislature, and in 1854, when the
first criminal code was adopted, provision was made for appeals in
misdemeanor cases substantially as now allowed, but in felony cases
an appeal on behalf of the defendant would not lie unless allowed
by one of the judges of the Court of Appeals after an examination
of the record. This restriction on the right of appeal by the defendant in felony cases was continued until the code of 1873 was
adopted, in which the defendant for the first time was given an
appeal as a matter of right.
Coming now to the inferior courts: By an act of 1792, passed
a few months after the adoption of the first Constitution, provision
was made for justices' courts, and a county court in each county,
to be held by not less than three justices, atd in this act the Courts
of Quarter Sessions and Oyer and Terminer were created.
The Court of Quarter Sessions was composed of three justices of
the peace, two of whom might act, and was given jurisdiction in
all civil cases except minor ones, and of criminal cases in which the
judgment did not involve "loss of life or member."
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This act also made provision for the short lived Court of Oyer
and Terminer, to be composed of three judges sitting in Lexington, two of whom might hold a court. This court had jurisdiction
only of criminal and penal eases and was abolished in 1795.
In 1795 District Courts were established and the state was divided
into districts, with six judges for each district, two of whom might
hold the court in any county, and these judges meeting in general
session at Frankfort assigned the judges that should hold the courts
in the various counties which were then few in number. This court
had general jurisdiction of all criminal and civil cases except those
that the court of Quarter Sessions, still in existence, retained jurisdiction of. In 1796 provision was made for holding two aniual
sessions of the District Court at Frankfort, and in 1799 the district
court to be held at Frankfort was styled the General Court, and appeals to it in land cases were allowed from the district courts.
In 1802 the Quarter Sessions, District and General Courts were
abolished and the state divided into circuit districts and courts styled
Circuit Courts, established in place of the other named courts This
act also made provision for the appointment in each county of two
"fit persons" to act as associate circuit judges, and any two of these
judges might hold court. The office of associate judge was abolished
in 1816. A general court was re-established, to be composed of all
the circuit judges, and it was provided that not less than five of them
should constitute the court, which should hold two terms each year
in Frankfort. This general court, which was really created for the
purpose of deciding controversies concerning land, had appellate
jurisdiction of land cases tried in the circuit courts, and original
jurisdiction of this class of cases when the parties consented thereto,
and limited jurisdiction in other civil cases.
It was given authority to assign the judges to the districts in
which they should hold court, so that the first circuit judges of the
state might be assigned to hold the circuit court at any place in the
state. It continued in existence until 1851, when it was abolished, and
all the cases pending before it transferred to the Franklin Circuit
Court.
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In connection with these various courts which I have mentioned,
it is worthy of notice that in neither of the two first Constitutions
or in the legislative acts creating them, were any qualifications for
the judges who were appointed by the Governor prescribed, except
that the associate judges must, in the quaint phraseology of the act
creating them, be "fit persons." As these associate judges were not
required to be lawyers it may be presumed that a "fit person" was a
man of integrity, good common sense and high character.
With this too brief account of the origin and the history of our
appellate and circuit judiciary, I want now to spend a little time in
considering the importance of the circuit court, which in my judgment, has a more useful place in the scheme of government than does
the Court of Appeals. We might do without the Court of Appeals,
but widespread confusion, disorder and violence would surely follow
the abolishment of our circuit courts, unless some other court with
like jurisdiction and power were appointed to take its place.
I said in the opening of my remarks that I esteemed it an honor
and privilege to be permitted to address this gathering of judges and
lawyers, and if it were composed of the circuit judges alone I would
further add that I was speaking to the forty-three most powerful men
in the entire state, because, in my opinion, there cannot b. found in
the borders of the Commonwealth any body or set of men who exercise such large powers as do circuit judges in everything that concerns the social, domestic, business and orderly life of the people
or who have as much influence in fostering a wholesome, moral and
law-observing sentiment.
The circuit judges deal face to face with the people of the state,
and hear and determine all of their troubles and misfortunes, whether
arising in the home, the factory, the office, the store, the mine or the
field. There come to them every color, age and condition found in
Kentucky, and they hear the frailties, the weaknesses, the vices and
the wickedness of all classes. Although there are many officers, such
as policemen, sheriffs and the like, who are charged with the duty of
maintaining peace and order, the circuit judges have at last more
power in the prevention of crime, the preservation of order, the pro-
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tection of life and the security of property, aside from other large
authority in the settlement of disputes that involve domestic tranquility than any other set of men in the state. They preside over
courts having a general common law, equity and criminal jurisdiction,
and take cognizance of all character of cases, both civil and criminal,
unless the amount involved is trivial or the offense trifling Their
decrees they have the power to enforce, and back of their orders and
judgments stands the Commonwealth of Kentucky with all its men
and all its means.
No more striking illustration of the supreme confidence that the
people have in one of their fellow citizens can be described than to
say they have chosen him for the office of judge in a high court and
put in his keeping the great powers that belong to such a place, and
more than two millions of people in the state have confided to fortythree men the iight to hear and decide every dispute involving property, personal and civil rights, that may arise, and bring to the bar of
justice every person who violates the penal and criminal laws of the
state so that the punishment denounced may be inflicted.
It is a high compliment indeed that so small a body of men
should be selected by the people of the state and invested with authority to pronounce judgment in every case that may arise respecting
their lives, liberty and property. And I am happy to be able to say
that in the entire history of the state the examples are exceedingly
rare in which circuit judges have betrayed the confidence reposed
in them, or failed to discharge with integrity, character and ability,
the duties of the high office.
Of course, circuit judges, like all other judges, make mistakes,
and it sometimes happens that. in circuit courts there is such a gross
miscarriage of justice due to the findings of juries that the conscience
of all those acquainted with it are startled and shocked by the result.
But instances of this character are few and beyond the power of the
judge to control; and I may safely say that upon the whole, the manner in which the law is administered and justice dispensed in circuit
courts is satisfactory to the great body of the people, who have an

The State Judiciary
abiding and well deserved confidence in the honesty of the men who
preside in these courts.
But unfortunately it cannot be overlooked that there are a few
large, thoroughly organized and widely distributed bodies of men in
this country whose leaders for purposes of their own are disposed to
treat with contempt the authority of the courts and to endeavor to
bring into disrepute the law as administered by those judges whose
decisions do not meet with their approval. The representatives of
one of those bodies have defiantly declared that they will not give
obedience to such orders and judgments as do not suit their pleasure,
and the spokesmen of another have boldly announced that they will
have those judges impeached who do not decide cases to suit their
wishes.
But I do not believe the men who give utterance to sentiments
like these, although professing to speak with authority for the organiYations they represent, are voicing the feelings of any more than a
small minority, and their lawless and reckless statements deliberately
formulated and publicly proclaimed deserve the severest reprobation.
I do not, of course, mean to imply that courts and judges should be
immune from fair criticism and reasonable censure, because they
are not, nor should they be, but there is a wide difference between fair
criticism and reasonable censure and destructive attacks such as these.
Men in high places who wilfully undertake to impair or destroy,
by the weight of their influence and the numbers they assumed to
speak for, the authority, freedom and independence of the judiciary
are striking at that department of the government that at all times
has shown itself fearless and -vigilant in protecting the personal and
civil rights of the people, and it is the duty and should be the pleasure
of the sensible and good men who compose an overwhelming majority
of our citizenship to stand by their courts and judges, and defend
them against all assaults having a tendency to lessen their dignity,
weaken their influence or impair their independence and stability, because there comes a time in the life of almost every person when in
some way or for some cause he must turn to the courts for advice,
protection or relief.
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It is appropriate that I should put here the weighty words of
that great statesman and jurist, Judge Story, who said in his commentaries on the Constitution, nearly 100 years ago, in speaking
of the judiciary, that "When there is no judicial department to interpret, pronounce and execute the law, decide controversies, and to
enforce rights, the government must either perish by its own imbecility, or the other departments of government must usurp powers,
for the purpose of commanding obedience, to the destruction of liberty. The will of those who govern will become, under such circumstances, absolute and despotic, and it is wholly immaterial whether
power is vested in a single tyrant or in assembly of tyrants.....
And it is no less true, that personal security and private property
rest entirely upon the wisdom, the stability, and the integrity of the
courts of justice.
"If that government can be truly said to be despotic and intolerable in which the law is vague and uncertain, it cannot but be ren
dered still more oppressive and more mischievous, when the actual
administration of justice is dependent upon caprice, or favor, upon the
will of rulers, or the influence of popularity. When power becomes
right, it is of little consequence whether decisions rest upon corruption, or weakness, upon the accidents of chance, or upon deliberate
wrong. In every well organized government, therefore, with reference to the security both of public rights and private rights, it is
indispensable that there should be a judicial department to ascertain
and decide rights, to punish crimes, to administer justice, and to
protect the innocent from injury and usurpation. To the people at
lafge, therefore, such an institution is peculiarly valuable and it
ought to be eminently cherished by them. On its firm and independent structure they may repose with safety, while they perceive
in it a faculty which is only set in motion when applied to; but
which, when thus brought into action, must proceed with competent
power, if required to correct the error or subdue the oppression of the
other branches of the government.
"This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
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these ill rumors which the arts of designing men or the influence of
particular conjectures sometimes disseminate among the people themselves; and which, though they speedily give place to better information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime,
to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community."
Laws are enacted and courts established for the purposes declared in the Constitution of so regulating and controlling human
affairs that the inherent and inalienable rights of persons to pursue
their safety and happiness; to acquire and protect property; to defend
their lives and liberties; to freely communicate their thoughts and
opinions; and to worship according to the dictates of their consciences
may be forever preserved, but, notwithstanding the security afforded
by these laws, and the efforts of the courts to protect the citizen in
the enjoyment of these guaranteed rights there are times when men
in large bodies attempt to take into their own hands redress of real
or imaginary wrongs and visit upon the objects of their enmity destruction of life and property.
When conditions like these arise which cannot, except in rare
cases, be attributed to either the state of the law or the manner of
its administrationa, the courts, however energetic and vigilant in the
performance of their duties, may find that for the moment they are
unable to control the situation, but the judges of circuit courts, having, as I said, all the forces of the Commonwealth behind them, have
no higher duty to perform than to exert the great powers of their
office to suppress these outbursts of crime and bring to punishment
the offenders.
It should never be forgotten that the supremacy of the law and
preservation of order are just as indispensable to the happiness of
one class of our decent citizenship as another. The laboring man
who earns a support for his family by the sweat of his brow and
the capitalist who lives on his income, are equally and alike entitled
to feel that his home and his property, whether they be big or little,
are secure from intrusion and violence and his person safe from attack.
There is no distinction to be made in this respect between any person
or class of persons.

70
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In conclusion permit me to express the hope that these meetings,
so auspiciously begun a few years ago, may be continued at short
intervals, to the end that the judges and lawyers of the state may
have the opportunity that would not otherwise be afforded to become
better acquainted, and to reuew in free and genial intercourse that
fine spirit of fraternal relationship that in full measure has alwaysexisted between the bench and the bar.

